



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ILLEGIB



25X1

OFFICIAL REPORT

on the

1955

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION

Number 1

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Official Report on the  
1955 National Intelligence Orientation Number 1

I. INTRODUCTION

The 1955 National Intelligence Orientation Number 1 was conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday, February 1 and 2, 1955, in the U. S. Department of Agriculture Auditorium. This is the twelfth such course conducted under Agency Regulation Number

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II. EVALUATION

A. First Day

1. General Comment

On the whole the presentations during the first day were weak in content and dull in presentation, adding up to an unsatisfactory expenditure of time for both participants and audience.

2. Specific

a. OPENING REMARKS BY THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

The efforts of Matthew Baird were one of the bright spots in the morning's program. This was by far the best effort of the D/TR in opening one of these programs. The story he told in simple, forceful manner of the two schools of thought as illustrated by the expressions of two people, one of whom considered this kind of training "eyewash" and the other who was desirous of getting every kind of training, was most appropriate for launching this two-day program.

b. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE DDCI

It is most regrettable that our capable DDCI can't even

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"read" well. The substance of his remarks was suitable to the occasion as he told about the place of intelligence in the national structure of Government and the rechartering of the WATCH Committee with the National Indications Center development, but these and other ideas were absorbed by the speaker's podium as the DDCI kept himself glued to his paper.

c. ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE IN SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY

25X1 [ ] has been told already how much we appreciate his cooperation in stepping into a gap which existed in the program. Perhaps this short notice justifies the leap-frog impression which his ideas made. As he reached into Soviet history to show that military power is just another political weapon and then explained the functions of such military force, we had the feeling that Jack's presentation lacked a degree of cohesiveness which could have improved it considerably.

d. OVERT AND CLANDESTINE AGENCY RELATIONS

This was the second bright spot in the program of the morning. Subjectwise Dick used to good advantage the power of undertone as he did not oversell nor overemphasize DD/P. His explanations for protecting agent personnel and for assuring success in clandestine undertakings were very convincing.

e. RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Though Bob Amory is at ease on the platform, this faculty was not enough to carry him at this program. As he threw in tidbits of interest, he made the impression that his presentation was "off the cuff." We heard too many clichéd expressions from him together

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with a preponderance of word padding which included numerous "so on and so forth" and "as you already know." Furthermore, he had a tendency to duplicate what had been said previously, even though poorly, by General Cabell.

f. MANPOWER UTILIZATION IN CIA

Sixty per cent of Red White's remarks was too general to mean anything specific. He warmed up in the last part of his presentation when his dynamism drove home a few salient thoughts about tables of organization and budgets.

B. Second Day

1. General Comment

The program as a unit was salvaged by the performances of our participants on the second day. In fact, the second day was so good that the weaknesses of the first day were so overshadowed as to be almost forgotten.

2. Specific

a. THE ENEMY WE FACE

25X1 [ ] spoke with conviction, with belief and with deep faith in analyzing atheistic dictatorship. His presentation was optimistic and left the audience with a feeling of renewed confidence in the philosophy underlying Christian democracy. This 25X1 [ ] drove home very well by showing us that the Soviets were the victims of their own system in which complete regimentation tends to make automotons out of human beings.

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b. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TODAY

Harry Rositzke painted a convincing word picture of the thoroughness of the Soviet intelligence by describing the manner in which the informant system permeates all activities in Soviet life and then made the pertinent observation about the recent determination to raise the level of intelligence to a key spot at the top echelon of Soviet government.

c. LEVELS OF COORDINATION IN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

25X1 [ ] gave us a realistic presentation about the interworkings of coordination in our Federal intelligence system referring to responsibilities and organizational structures. He left us with the realistic impression that there is no one cycle of coordination and no single definable pattern.

d. TRAINING FOR AN INTELLIGENCE CAREER

As we listened to [ ] do his customary good job, some of us began to feel a sense of frustration as to where we would find a substitute to do this subject when Hugh leaves us. Even those of us who have heard this presentation before thoroughly enjoyed and benefited by [ ] efforts because of the sincerity with which he spoke.

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e. CURRENT AGENCY PROBLEMS

The Inspector General's contributions to these Orientation programs are adopting a pertinence and continuity which makes them most appropriate. On this occasion Kirk covered three problems, viz., clandestine operations and diplomacy, investigations, and

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secrecy, and in each instance he made a potent point which was applicable to current thinking in the intelligence field.

f. DIRECTOR'S MESSAGE

The Director of Central Intelligence said words of comfort to all of the personnel in general and to Training in particular. His presence was, of course, a very satisfying climax to the program.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. In May we continue the format of the two-day program.
2. We make a decision in the near future on our guest speaker.

The fact that a draft has been prepared inviting Secretary Anderson does not mean that he will be available. Therefore, if he replies in the negative, we should take quick steps to get somebody else. Otherwise, we will end up with the same difficulties we have experienced in the past.

3. Since it is inevitable that we continue to have our DDCI, perhaps his presentation would be enlivened if we allowed the audience to submit questions to him on an ad hoc basis. P

4. We retain Mr. Richard Helms to cover OVERT AND CLANDESTINE AGENCY RELATIONS. O.K.

5. We drop Mr. Robert Amory from the next program to make room for new blood and a subject presentation which is of a different category. Approving this recommendation will avoid the tendency toward duplication which exists between Amory, [ ] and the DDCI. No

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6. In place of Amory we begin a cycle of key IAC presentations beginning in our next program with Major General Trudeau to cover "G-2 and Its Relations with CIA."

7. We retain Colonel White, who in his new capacity as DD/S should be able to make an appropriate presentation on "Current Problems in the Support Field."

8. We secure the services of [ ] friend who is on the staff of the National War College to have him cover THE ENEMY WE FACE.

9. We retain the rest of the second day of the program intact, and if we are so unfortunate as to lose [ ] between now and the first week of May, that the Director of Training make the decision as to who will cover the important subject, TRAINING FOR AN INTELLIGENCE CAREER.

#### IV. APPRECIATION

1. Our thanks to the Director of Training for his patience in allowing himself to be bothered at all hours of the day on the unanticipated and seemingly unavoidable problems which we face every time one of these programs is conducted.

2. Most helpful was the backing and support which we received from [ ] who was an ever-willing evaluator for ideas and suggestions.

3. Prior to and at the actual staging of the program, [ ] displayed unusual resourcefulness in assuming many and diverse responsibilities, all of which he carried out with marked efficiency.

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25X1 4. To [ ] who worked with the girls assigned to the audi-  
25X1 torium; to [ ] who was so resourceful in making the last  
25X1 minute "insurance" calls to participants; and to the members of [ ]  
[ ] staff who worked with us each day go votes of sincere thanks  
for their splendid cooperation.

Respectfully submitted,

[ ]  
Chief, Orientation and Briefing,  
Basic School

SMacC/jet (3 March 1955)

Distribution:

Orig & lcc: D/TR ✓  
lcc: C/BS/TR  
lcc: C/OB/BS/TR

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OFFICIAL ATTENDANCE REPORT

The attendance at the 1955 National Intelligence Orientation Number 1, based upon the attendance cards, is as follows:

a) By Office:

OD/CI . . . . .	8
ODD/A . . . . .	2
ODD/I . . . . .	1
ODD/P . . . . .	12
Audit . . . . .	3
Communications . . . . .	23
Comptrollers . . . . .	14
Logistics . . . . .	28
Management . . . . .	2
Personnel . . . . .	26
Security . . . . .	20
Training . . . . .	23
OGD . . . . .	26
OCI . . . . .	17
ONE . . . . .	1
O-O . . . . .	38
ORR . . . . .	31
OSI . . . . .	16
FI . . . . .	45
PI . . . . .	5
TSS . . . . .	20
EE . . . . .	25
FE . . . . .	19
NEA . . . . .	17
SE . . . . .	6
SR . . . . .	15
WE . . . . .	22
WH . . . . .	6
	457
IAC Guests . . . . .	20
Total . . . . .	477

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b) By Grade:

GS-3 . . . . .	11 *
GS-4 . . . . .	29 *
GS-5 . . . . .	110 *
GS-6 . . . . .	29
GS-7 . . . . .	75
GS-8 . . . . .	10
GS-9 . . . . .	52
GS-10 . . . . .	1
GS-11 . . . . .	38
GS-12 . . . . .	44
GS-13 . . . . .	23
GS-14 . . . . .	11
GS-15 . . . . .	6
GS-16 . . . . .	2
Military . . . . .	13
CIA No Grade . . . . .	<u>3</u>
Total . . . . .	457

\* The 150 persons in GS-3, GS-4, and GS-5 attended at the request of their supervisors.

c) By Tenure:

Under six months . . .	64	14%
Over six months . . .	<u>393</u>	<u>86%</u>
Total . . . . .	457	100%

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